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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND EMPLOYEE
SELECTION
Elizabeth A. Rowe*
INTRODUCTION
Like many other similar establishments, Playboy Clubs offer
food, drink, and entertainment. Unlike any other establishment,
however, the servers at the Playboy Clubs are young, beautiful
women who wear costumes with rabbit ears and tails. They are
called "Bunnies," and they must fit the "Bunny Image" in order to be
hired and retained in their position.' Bunnies must meet certain
high appearance standards and are evaluated on the following scale:
(1) - A flawless beauty (face, figure, and grooming)
(2) - An exceptionally beautiful girl
(3) - Marginal (is aging or has developed a correctable
appearance problem)
(4) - Has lost Bunny Image (either through aging or an
uncorrectable appearance problem).2
A Bunny Manual provides the rules governing the appearance
and behavior of the Bunnies. It details, for instance, that Bunnies
are never allowed to chew gum or sit down while on duty.3 They are
* Feldman Gale Term Professor in Intellectual Property, UF Research
Foundation Professor of Law, and Director, Program in Intellectual Property
Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. Thank you to Mary Jane
Angelo, Jacqueline Lipton, Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Roger Perlstadt, and Katheryn
Russell-Brown for comments or conversations about ideas expressed in earlier
versions of this work. I appreciate the feedback from participants at the 2011
Intellectual Property Scholars Conference held at DePaul University College of
Law, a faculty colloquium at Case Western University Reserve Law School, and
an early work discussion at the University of Florida Levin College of Law. I
am very grateful to Robyn Shelton for excellent research assistance at the
inception of this project and to Matthew Morrow and Andrew Simler who later
joined the effort. Finally, thank you to the University of Florida Levin College
of Law for its research support.
1. Aromi v. Playboy Club, Inc., No. CS-32986-74, slip op. at 6 (N.Y. State
Div. Human Rights Aug. 1, 1985) (quoting Margarita St. Cross v. Playboy Club,
Inc., No. CSF-22618-70 (N.Y. State Human Rights App. B. Dec. 17, 1971)),
available at http://njlegallib.rutgers.edulmisc/aromi.pdf.
2. Id.
3. See RUSSELL MILLER, BUNNY: THE REAL STORY OF PLAYBOY 80 (1984).
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not allowed to date customers or have bad hair, bad nails, bad
makeup, or a dirty tail. 4
When a business like the Playboy Club decides on a strategy to
differentiate itself from its competitors in the marketplace, often
this will lead to the creation of intellectual property ("IP"). The
Playboy Bunny costume is reported to be the first uniform registered
as a trademark.5 The mark is described as "a three dimensional
bunny costume worn by a woman. The costume includes a corseted
bodice, bunny ears worn on the head, a bunny tail on the back of the
bodice, a name tag on the front of the bodice, wrist cuffs and a bow
tie collar."6 It goes without saying that Bunnies must be female.7
In today's marketplace, service companies are increasingly
integrating their image into the service that they provide. This has
come to be known as "branded service."8 The human wearing the
trade dress merges with the brand image. This then necessarily
influences hiring decisions. If the Playboy Bunny costume is
trademarked, only a person who fits the Bunny Image will wear that
costume. No men and likely no women over a certain age (who no
longer meet the appropriate proportions) will be hired as Playboy
Bunnies.
If a business decides not to hire a prospective employee because
she does not fit the company's image and that decision is challenged
under antidiscrimination laws, to what extent should IP law serve
as a defense for the company's employee selection? While the role of
IP in employment generally is not new,9 no scholar has previously
explored this aspect of the intersection: the role of IP in an
employment discrimination claim. As it currently stands,
employment discrimination law does not consider IP in any capacity.
Accordingly, this Article is the first to suggest and examine bridging
the worlds of employment discrimination law and intellectual
property.
The objective of this Article is to introduce the idea that there
could be a place for IP in employment discrimination jurisprudence.
The proposed mechanism for integrating these two areas is through
4. Id. at 80-81.
5. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 762,884 (filed June 24, 1963); The Bunny
Costume, SMITHSONIAN INST., http://historywired.si.eduldetail.cfm?ID=126 (last
visited Nov. 8, 2012).
6. PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES INTERNATIONAL, INC., Registration No.
77,033,482.
7. Aromi, No. CS-32986-74, slip op. at 5-7.
8. Dianne Avery & Marion Crain, Branded: Corporate Image, Sexual
Stereotyping, and the New Face of Capitalism, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y
13, 19 (2007).
9. Cases dealing with noncompetition agreements, trade secrets, and
employee ownership issues, for instance, involve application of intellectual
property in the workplace.
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a flexible "IP Defense" that would require an employer defending an
employment discrimination case on the basis of IP to establish that
(1) it owns IP rights, (2) there is a relationship between the IP and
the business practice that resulted in the employee selection
decision, (3) the job description is tied to the IP, and (4) there is a
direct financial correlation between the IP and the company's
business success.
To be clear, the IP Defense is not meant to replace or change the
fundamental tenets of employment discrimination law, nor is the
intent to make it easier for employers to discriminate. The reality is
that plaintiff-employees in employment discrimination cases already
face a much lower chance of success relative to defendant-employers,
and more generally to other kinds of plaintiffs.10 Accordingly,
effective use of the IP Defense by employers is not likely to swing
the odds of winning away from plaintiffs in any significant way.
Indeed, favoring the application of antidiscrimination policies, the
IP Defense could benefit plaintiffs in the litigation process by adding
greater specificity and objectivity to considerations of pretext. As
one court has noted, "subjective criteria are particularly easy for an
employer to invent" when trying to defeat a plaintiffs discrimination
claim,11 and as such, the IP Defense would offer greater assurance
that the employer's proffered reason for its hiring decision is
legitimate and not a pretext.
Moreover, the IP Defense is not akin to a grant of immunity.
Rather, it requires balancing, on a case-by-case basis, IP rights and
antidiscrimination policies through the existing framework of Title
VII. It embodies several limiting principles that both substantively
and procedurally place the burden on the defendant-employer to
establish, among other things, that there is a legitimate and strong
nexus between the propounded IP right and the employee selection
decision. In addition, as a normative matter, IP compares favorably
to the wide variety of defenses and exceptions that already exist to
insulate employee selection decisions in the employment
discrimination jurisprudence.
Following this Introduction, Part I provides examples of
branded service and the ways in which some well-known companies
have used and integrated it with their human resource policies,
especially those rules governing employees' appearance. Part II
reviews the relevant employment law principles, with a focus on
10. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment
Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. &
POL'Y REV. 103, 127 (2009); see also Franita Tolson, The Boundaries of
Litigating Unconscious Discrimination: Firm-Based Remedies in Response to a
Hostile Judiciary, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 347, 367-68 (2008).
11. Thomas v. Denny's, Inc., 111 F.3d 1506, 1510 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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Title VII claims. Part III introduces the IP Defense and explores
why it makes sense to integrate IP into the employment
discrimination framework. Finally, the Article concludes that the
time has come to bridge this gap between employment
discrimination law and IP.
I. ILLUSTRATIONS OF "BRANDED SERVICE"
Brands alone can be tremendously valuable to any company.
The world's most valuable brand, Apple, is estimated to be worth
$182 billion.12 Successful branding is especially important in today's
competitive business environment because it helps form the
corporate identity.' 3  "[A] strong brand can provide powerful
competitive advantages such as great customer loyalty, higher
margins, and opportunities for brand extension and licensing."14 It
offers powerful benefits to trademark owners as well as to
consumers.15 This is why the companies highlighted in this Part
place such an emphasis on branded service.
The term "branded service" refers to the process by which
businesses integrate their image into the service they provide using
their human resource policies.16 In today's competitive marketplace,
brands are not just the logos or slogans that are attached to
products and services. Instead, they "are the values, beliefs, and
service experiences that underpin them."17 Thus, customer service
and the employees who deliver that service are of utmost
importance.18 IP rights, such as trademarks,19 further support
companies' efforts to differentiate themselves from competitors, to
be recognizable to consumers, and to communicate to consumers
brand identity and corporate identity. This has always required
consistency in the way the trademark looks (e.g., all the Playboy
Bunny costumes must look exactly the same). More and more,
12. BrandZ Top 100 Most Valuable Global Brands 2012, BRANDZ,http://www.wpp.com/NR/rdonlyres/4B44C834-AEA8-4951-871A
-A5B937EBFD3E/0/brandz_2012_top_100.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2012).
13. See Sonia K. Katyal, Stealth Marketing and Antibranding: The Love
that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 795, 801 (2010).
14. Kirk Martensen, How Much for the Brand License?, GOLDMARKS (Nov.
2003), http://www.goldmarks.net/papre brandlicense.shtml.
15. See Jerre B. Swann, An Interdisciplinary Approach to Brand Strength,
96 TRADEMARK REP. 943, 954-57 (2006).
16. Avery & Crain, supra note 8, at 18-19.
17. See JANELLE BARLOW & PAUL STEWART, BRANDED CUSTOMER SERVICE:
THE NEW COMPETITIVE EDGE 23 (2006).
18. See id.
19. A trademark is statutorily defined as "any word, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof... used by a person ... to identify and
distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those
manufactured or sold by others." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
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however, business experts have noted that consistency is also
required across the many ways in which customers encounter a
company's service, particularly in the human interactions with
employees. 20 Many companies have pursued branded service as a
way to distinguish themselves from competitors. A few of their
stories, representing a range of industries, are captured below.
A. Disney
One of the pioneering companies in branded service is Walt
Disney. From the very beginning, the entrepreneur and animator
cultivated the "Disney Look" by hiring only clean-cut workers to
staff his family-centered Disneyland park that opened in California
in 1955.21 The goal was to create a wholesome atmosphere that
would set Disneyland apart from the "sleazy carnival[]" image
associated with amusement parks at the time.22 Early employee
rules focused on the extremes-prohibiting excessive makeup and
jewelry, extravagant hairstyles, and unkempt looks. 23 But by 1958,
Disney's general guidelines had become all-encompassing rules that
are delineated today in a forty-page book with illustrations of
permissible and impermissible attire and grooming.24  The
appearance code is testimony to Walt Disney's micromanaging
approach to his product.25 Though the Disney patriarch died a year
before the Magic Kingdom opened near Orlando in 1971, his brother
Roy Disney ensured that the Florida-based workforce embodied the
corporate image.26
Efforts to create the Disney experience are legendary. The
62,000 workers27 who are part of Disney's sprawling Florida empire
are expected to fall in line. Even the language used by Disney
inculcates its brand in the workforce. Prospective employees do not
interview for jobs, they "audition[" to become "cast members."28
They wear "costumes," not uniforms. 29 Those who interact directly
with guests work "onstage," while dishwashers, kitchen staff, and
20. See BARLOW & STEWART, supra note 17, at 21-23.
21. Avery & Crain, supra note 8, at 27.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Mark Albright, PR and Pixie Dust, Too, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES
(Florida), Oct. 2, 2011, at D1 (describing Walt Disney as "the kindest man and
the most demanding micromanager" who "rarely handed out praise").
26. See id.
27. Id.
28. Kit Johnson, The Wonderful World of Disney Visas, 63 FLA. L. REV. 915,
919-20 (2011) (describing how Disney successfully lobbied the government to
create a special class of visas that allow Disney to employ thousands of
international workers annually).
29. Id. at 919.
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others are "backstage" employees. 30 All are responsible for creating
"Disney magic" 31 for the company's 180,00032 paying guests daily.
Every detail of an employee's appearance must conform to the
"Disney Look." Frowning is prohibited, and sunglasses are strongly
discouraged because they block "interpersonal communication with
Guests," but if they must be worn, the worker's eyes need to be
visible through the lenses.33 Undergarments are required, but they
must not be seen, and cannot be "patterned or colored" if the
employee's costume is light in color.34 Prospective employees will
not be hired if they have visible tattoos.35 Except for the earrings
allowed on female employees, workers cannot have "[j]ewelry,
spacers, retainers, or plugs" in any body piercings during working
hours-even those that are not visible to the public.36 Other jewelry
guidelines stress simplicity. Females can wear matching earrings,
either pierced or clipped but only one per ear and never exceeding
the size of a quarter or extending more than two inches beneath the
earlobe.37 Men are permitted one ring on each hand, a "classic,
business-style wristwatch," cuff links, and a small tie tack if
desired.38
The clothing requirements for each gender are exhaustive,
allowing no more than three inches of skin to be visible above a
female's kneeS39 and limiting men to "traditionally acceptable"
fabrics such as tweed, cotton, polyester, or silk.40 Hair coloring is
permissible if "natural-looking and well maintained."41 Subtle
highlights are allowed, but the "Disney Look does not permit
extremes in dyeing, bleaching or coloring."42 Disney only recently
amended its policy to allow facial hair on male employees, 43 who
30. Id.
31. Id. at 948.
32. See Albright, supra note 25.
33. See The Disney Look: General Guidelines, DISNEY INT'L PROGRAMS,
https://www.disneyinternationalprograms.com/seasonal/look-guidelines.html
(last visited Nov. 7, 2012).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. One wonders how Disney would know about nonvisible body
piercings.
37. The Disney Look: All Female Cast Members, DISNEY INT'L PROGRAMS,
https://www.disneyinternationalprograms.com/seasonal/lookfemalecast.html
(last visited Nov. 8, 2012).
38. The Disney Look: All Male Cast Members, DISNEY INT'L PROGRAMS,
https://www.disneyinternationalprograms.com/seasonal/lookmalecast.html
(last visited Nov. 8, 2012).
39. The Disney Look: All Female Cast Members, supra note 37.
40. The Disney Look: All Male Cast Members, supra note 38.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Fashion Statements: The Disney Look, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6, 2012, at 14.
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must keep the hair trimmed to no more than a quarter of an inch in
length. The guidelines tell cast members to consult Disney's official
Cast Image and Appearance Team for specific feedback on
acceptable mustaches, beards, and goatees. 44  Disney's website
provides this overarching message on appearance:
No matter where you work or what your role is, anytime you
are in a public area, you are "on stage." Your attitude and
performance are direct reflections on the quality of our Disney
show. Often it's the seemingly little things that detract from
our Guests' enjoyment - chewing gum, having poor posture,
using a cellular phone or frowning. Of course smoking and
eating on stage are also strictly prohibited. All of this adds up
to one of the most important aspects of your role in our show:
good stage presence. 45
The approach ensures uniformity and propagates the
wholesome, family image that Walt Disney himself insisted upon
from the company's earliest days. 46 Moving beyond Disney, the
remaining companies in this Part focused less on a wholesome,
family image and more on female sex appeal in delivering their
branded service.
B. Southwest Airlines
Southwest Airlines had a difficult beginning. After the airline
incorporated in 1967, incumbent air carriers challenged Southwest's
application to enter the Texas commuter market, keeping it on the
ground with both state and federal litigation that did not end until
December 1970.47 Southwest finally could fly. But by that point,
the airline had spent more than $530,000 in legal fees, leaving it
with $143 in the bank and more than $100,000 in debt.4 8 In early
1971, Southwest hired a Dallas advertising agency to pave its way
into the market with a "catchy" image that would help it stand out.4 9
The result was the Love Airline.50
The advertising agency found that Southwest's competitors
projected a conservative image for their mostly male business
flyers.51 The agency decided that Southwest could differentiate
44. See The Disney Look: All Male Cast Members, supra note 38.
45. The Disney Look: General Guidelines, supra note 33.
46. Avery & Crain, supra note 8, at 27.
47. Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 293-94 (N.D. Tex. 1981)
(explaining that the U.S. Supreme Court denied the incumbent airlines' petition
for a writ of certiorari in December of 1970).
48. Id. at 294.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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itself by enticing travelers with "feminine youth and vitality."52 The
airline thus adopted an express policy preferring female employees
who go "through life with great flair and exuberance."53 The ideal
Southwest employee was witty, charming, and exciting, yet efficient
in undertaking "all her tasks with care and attention."54 Long legs
didn't hurt either.55 Sex appeal became the cornerstone of the
airline's personality. Flight attendants wore hot pants and calf-
hugging boots that laced up in the front.56  In television
commercials, the women sashayed across the runway, asking,
"Remember what it was like before there was somebody else up
there who loved you?"5 7  In one print advertisement under a
headline that read "The Love Seat," three comely attendants doted
on a disheveled, balding businessman.5 8 In others, bulging cartoon
hearts were etched with the promise: "We're Spreading Love All
Over Texas."5 9
But it was about fun too. The airline encouraged its flight
attendants to create an informal atmosphere on board.60 They held
who-has-the-biggest-hole-in-his-sock contests and encouraged
passengers to see how many people could squeeze into the
bathroom.61 On Halloween, the plane was Transylplania, and flight
attendants would cajole male passengers to don fangs and smear on
fake blood as Draculas.62 Southwest once took out a two-page
newspaper advertisement to explain how its sexy flight attendants
embodied the airline's "Fun-LUVing Attitude"63:
She will not plee-aze you. Plee-aze is stiff, formal, and very
affected English for please. People who say plee-aze to you are
trying very, very hard to be nice to you. Too hard. And it isn't
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 60 Minutes: Herb and His Airline (CBS television broadcast May 27,
1990), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watchl?id=7423170n
(explaining that Southwest only hired "flight attendants with long legs, big
personalities, and, as Texas Monthly put it, looked like they all graduated from
the same West Texas high school").
56. Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 295.
57. See Southwest Airlines 1970's Commercial 4, YouTUBE,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2-gOyOFUlOQ (last visited Jan. 16, 2013).
58. Brian Lusk, Flashback Fridays: Early Southwest Print Advertisements,
BLOG SOUTHWEST (Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.blogsouthwest.com/blog/flashback
-fridays-early-southwest-print-advertisements.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See 60 Minutes, supra note 55 (interviewing three women who were
among the first flight attendants hired by the airline).
62. Id.
63. See Lusk, supra note 58 (explaining that the advertisement was timed
to run near the time of Southwest's first flights in 1971).
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real. It's like plastic flowers vs. real flowers. You can feel the
difference. That's why in our hosteSS64 school, we haven't
taught our girls how to be nice to you. We figure if they didn't
already know, they weren't for us.6 5
Southwest became known both nationally and internationally by its
"Love" persona, even trading on the New York Stock Exchange
under the symbol "LUV."66
The strategy paid off. By 1975, Southwest was the only heavy
carrier flying out of Dallas. 67 By the early 1980s, Southwest had
achieved "enormous success" in the Texas regional commuting
market.6 8  A district court in Texas concluded in 1981 that
"Southwest's unique, feminized image played and continues to play
an important role in the airline's success." 69 Yet that unique image
did not hold up under legal scrutiny and became the basis for one of
the seminal cases in employment discrimination law, as will be
discussed in the next Part.
After losing the lawsuit, Southwest was forced to hire men as
flight attendants and subsequently honed its image as a low-cost,
joke-cracking airline where applicants were instructed to send
resumes to the attention of "Elvis,"70 and the company's chief
executive officer handed out peanuts at 30,000 feet. 71 CEO Herb
Kelleher declared that he believed in the "school of management by
fooling around," and students at Harvard, Stanford, and other elite
schools have studied his innovative business methods.72 The airline
did not serve meals, assign seats, or offer a first-class section.73
Humor was mandatory, however, with personality replacing hot
pants as the defining characteristic of Southwest flight crews. "At
Southwest, hiring is almost a religion," Kelleher explained in 1990.
"Each employee is carefully screened for attitude. . . . We encourage
people to be individualistic, to enjoy themselves and to have a good
time."74
64. When Southwest Airlines began flying in the 1970s, flight attendants
were referred to as "hostesses."
65. Lusk, supra note 58.
66. Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 294 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 295.
69. Id.
70. A Hunk of Burning Love, ADWEEK, Oct. 8, 1990.
71. See 60 Minutes, supra note 55.
72. Id.
73. Associated Press, Southwest Airlines Grows Up To Face Some Mature
Questions, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 18, 1986, at C6.
74. 60 Minutes, supra note 55.
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C. Hooters
Hooters was the brainchild of former University of Illinois
football player Lynn Stewart, who pooled funds with five friends to
come up with $139,000 to build the first Hooters restaurant in
Clearwater, Florida in 1983.75 The men (who call themselves the
"Hooters Six"76) had a wings-sports-and-scantily-clad-waitress
theme for their casual, beachy establishment. Yet they were not
looking for just any pretty woman to deliver beer and food-they
wanted her to be the centerpiece of the restaurant itself. They
wanted the Hooters Girl.77 She had to be fresh-faced, all-American,
and shapely yet athletic.78 Beautiful yet not unattainable. The men
found her at a bikini contest on the beach.79
More than 300,000 women have worn the distinctive
uniform8o-orange shorts, panty hose, and a snug, white tank top
with "HOOTERS" stretched across the chest.8 1 The color scheme
and style have not changed since the uniform's inception in the early
1980s. Nor has much changed about the restaurant either.82 The
look is Florida beach shack, with wooden tables, t-shirts for sale,
cheeky signs on the walls ("Caution: Blonds Thinking" and "Men -
no shirt, no service. Women - no shirt, free food"), sports on the
televisions, and '60s-era music playing in the background. 83 Each
table has its own roll of paper towels so patrons can sop up the wing
sauce. 84
Hooters Girls must conform to the appearance regulations in
the company handbook.85 Only white bras are permitted. 86 The
required pantyhose must be "suntan" in tone and changed
75. HOOVER'S IN-DEPTH Co. REPORTS, HOOTERS OF AMERICA (2011).
76. Id.
77. David Finkel, 'Even If You're Not Funny, We'll Still Laugh' At Hooters,
Men Are Men and the Women Are Girls. Anyone Got a Problem with That?,
WASH. POST MAG., July 28, 1996, at 8.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Hooters reports that it currently employs about seventeen thousand
Hooters Girls. See About Hooters, HOOTERS, www.hooters.com/Company
/About.aspx (last visited Jan. 16, 2013). In 2004, a federal district court in
Orlando concluded that Hooters' orange shorts and white tank tops qualified as
distinctive trade dress, but that Hooters could not prevent other restaurants
from dressing their waitresses in other short-and-tank-top combinations. Hi
Ltd. P'ship v. Winghouse of Florida, 347 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1258-59 (M.D. Fla.
2004), aff'd, 451 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2006)
81. Hi Ltd. P'ship, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 1258.
82. See Finkel, supra note 77.
83. HOOVER'S IN-DEPTH Co. REPORTS, supra note 75.
84. Id.
85. Finkel, supra note 77.
86. Id.
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immediately if snagged during the work shift.87 Shorts should fit
comfortably but "never . . . so small that the buttocks show."88 The
tank top cannot be baggy, and "[u]nder no circumstances should bra
straps ever show."89 Hooters Girls are forbidden from having visible
tattoos or body piercings.90
Hooters makes no excuses for its unabashed love of the female
form-sarcastically noting on its website that "[c]laims that Hooters
exploits attractive women are as ridiculous as saying the NFL
exploits men who are big and fast."91 Hooters patrons are unlikely
to lie about their reasons for visiting the chain. You can get wings
just about anywhere. You go to Hooters for the view. Explained one
columnist: "Hooters is more than food, which is secondary. It is
entertainment, ambience, male bonding."92 However, the ambience
got Hooters in trouble in 1991, when the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") launched an investigation into
the chain's practice of hiring only women. 93 The case is discussed in
the next Part.
D. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders
As the nation's most recognizable cheerleading squad, the
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders ("DCC") must be pristine even in the
100-degree heat of a late summer football game in Texas. 94 Yet they
do not have the luxury of being mere eye candy. The cheerleaders
master more than fifty song and dance routines for every football
season.95 Embodying beauty, poise, and athleticism, the DCC
handpick the women who will represent their brand every year
during a grueling process that starts with roughly one thousand
hopefuls and finishes with an elite team of thirty-six who wear the
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. About Hooters, supra note 80.
92. Bill Maxwell, A Meditation on the Magic of Hooters, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES (Florida), Nov. 19, 1995, at 1D.
93. Chuck Hutchcraft, Hooters Case Won't Get a Second Look: EEOC
Chairman Cites Scarce Resources, CHI. TRIB. (May 2, 1996),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1996-05-02/business/9605020273_1_hooters
-girls-hooters-restaurants-eeoc.
94. See DCC History, DALLAS COWBOYS CHEERLEADERS,
http://www.dallascowboyscheerleaders.com/dcc-history/ (last visited Jan. 18,
2013) (explaining that Dallas Cowboys general manager Tex Schramm had
attempted to use attractive models instead of professional dancers, but three
hours of exertion in the 100-degree heat "left them in worse shape after the
game than the football players").
95. Id.
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iconic star-spangled, blue-and-white uniform. 96 The early DCC
rules required promptness, no gum chewing on the field, and no
fraternizing with the players.97 Today, there is a lengthy conduct
and appearance code. 98 Cheerleaders still cannot date Cowboys
players, nor can they fraternize with coaches or team
management.99  "Cheerleaders receive training in etiquette,
communications skills, media relations, and fan mail."100 The
trademarked uniforms can be worn only when authorized by the
DCC. When in uniform, the women are forbidden to drink, smoke,
or "conduct themselves in any manner not becoming to the tradition
of the DCC."01
The cheerleading squad has unparalleled recognition among its
NFL counterparts. The women have made guest appearances on
television shows, and the DCC were the subject of two made-for-
television movies, one starring Jane Seymour. 102 They do USO
tours overseas, star in commercials, and make their own exercise
DVDs. 103 Ever mindful of their ladylike image, the DCC have
challenged attempts to incorporate their coveted brand into less-
than-genteel products. In 1979, the Second Circuit upheld a
preliminary injunction barring release of a pornographic film in
which an actress was partly or fully clad in a cheerleading uniform
that was deemed confusingly similar to the DCCs' trademarked
uniform.104
96. Id. The intense competition to become a DCC has been the subject of a
Country Music Television network reality series, The Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders: Making the Team. The show warns:
This is not your mother's beauty contest. Sure, each girl has to be
attractive but, most important, they have to prove themselves in a
range of categories that include: athleticism (specific requirements for
everything from crunches to running the mile), dance (a range of
performances, from freestyle to being able to interpret a tightly
choreographed routines), football knowledge (yes, you have to prove
you know the game via a variety of tests), personality (you are
representing the Dallas Cowboys, the NFL, and a 50-year history of
tradition) and overall style.
About Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders: Making the Team, CMT,
http://www.cmt.com/show/dallas-cowboys-cheerleaders/season_2/series.jhtml
(last visited Jan. 13, 2013).
97. Joe Nick Patoski, Two, Four, Six, Eight. Who Do We Appreciate? The
Original Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, TEX. MONTHLY, Sept. 2001, at 124, 157.
98. DCC History, supra note 94.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Patoski, supra note 97, at 157.
103. Id.
104. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d
200, 205 (2d Cir. 1979) (enjoining the release of "Debbie Does Dallas" for
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E. Olialia and the Island of Blonds
Finally, taking branded service to what some may consider an
extreme is a new resort planned for the Maldives. If a Lithuanian
company follows through on its much-trumpeted plans,105 this is
what vacationers can expect at its island getaway in Maldives.
Guests will fly to the resort on a charter airline piloted by a blond
woman.106 Or they can sail to the island on a yacht with blond
women captains. 107 The bellhops who take visitors' suitcases will be
blond women. The front desk staff-blond women; the managers,
bartenders, food servers, chefs, grounds crew-mostly blonds and
mostly women. The Olialia company (pronounced ooh-la-LA) refers
to its proposal as a "fantasy resort," which the press has fittingly
dubbed the Island of the Blonds. 08
The company already uses blond women to promote products
ranging from cola and pizza to computer software and pop music. 109
Its models appear in Olialia advertisements, sometimes wearing
laboratory coats as they labor over the formula for Olialia cola or
applying makeup while draped around a conference table in tight
business suits during a board meeting. 1 0 Olialia claims that the
marketing strategy works. The company claims that eighty percent
of Lithuanians recognize its brand and expected to net $10 million
in profits in 2011.111 In joining the luxury vacation market, Olialia
has hired Lithuanian architect Valerijus Starkovskis112 to design a
including twelve minutes of footage that included a uniform resembling the
outfit worn by the DCC).
105. Christina Boyle, Lithuanian Company Olialia Wants to Operate Resort
in Maldives Run Exclusively by Blonds, N.Y. DAILY NEws (Oct. 3, 2010, 4:00
AM), http://articles.nydailynews.com/2010-10-03/news/27077001_1_blonds-limo
-and-bus-service-island.
106. The 'Island of the Blonds' in Maldives to be Shaped like Mega High-
Heeled Shoe, MALDIVESTODAY.COM (Jan. 25, 2011),
http://www.maldivestoday.com/2011/01/25/the-%e2%80%98island-of
-blondes%e2%80%99-in-maldives-to-be-shaped-like-mega-high-heeled-shoe/.
107. See Boyle, supra note 105.
108. Blonde-Only Fantasy Resort Planned for Maldives, CBSNEWS.COM (Feb.
4, 2011, 8:46 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-7314171.html;
Blondes-Only Resort Planned for the Maldives: Lithuanian Company Envisions
an 'Island of Blondes' but Critics Call Proposal Discriminatory, MSNBC.coM
(Oct. 5, 2010, 2:59 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39521684/ns/travel
-news/tfblondes-only-resort-planned-maldives/.
109. Damien McGuinness, Lithuanian Blonde Island Plan Raises Eyebrows,
BBC NEwS (Oct. 1, 2010, 9:50 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe
-11442920.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Matt Garrick, Peroxide Paradise Riles the Natives, BALTIC TIMES, May
4, 2011, available at http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/2861 1/.
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500-room resort, which has a tentative completion date of 2015.113
Leaving no detail untouched by the glitzy theme, Olialia plans to
mold its Maldivian island in the shape of a high-heeled shoe through
strategic reef reclamation.114
Olialia officials do not apologize for the company's blond
branding strategy, which has evoked sharp criticism from within
Lithuania and the Maldives-an ethnically diverse chain of more
than 1100 islands in the Indian Ocean.115 Critics deride the plans
as demeaning to women, sexist, racist, and discriminatory.116 An
Olialia official shrugged off such comments, explaining: "It is not
discrimination .... For example, if a ballet company is casting for a
male-only dance performance, is it discrimination against
women?"117 Nonetheless, under Maldivian law, at least fifty percent
of the resort's staff must be locals."18 This could be a challenge as
the native population is overwhelmingly nonwhite and nonblond.119
However, neither Olialia's general manager nor Maldivian tourism
officials see that requirement as a stumbling block. They have
suggested that nonblond women can wear wigs or, in the
alternative, "work behind the scenes." 120 Yet as Lithuania is a
member of the European Union, some question whether the project
violates EU employment law by preferentially seeking blond
women. 121 Again, Olialia officials dismiss those concerns, asserting
that the company welcomes applicants of all ethnic backgrounds,
hair colors, and ages.122 Men are expected to comprise about thirty-
five percent of the resort's workforce.123
II. RELEVANT EMPLOYMENT LAW PRINCIPLES
While branded service may serve as a great marketing or
business strategy, it could make companies vulnerable to
discrimination claims from employees, and may not itself serve as a
113. Liudas Dapkus, Blonde Island Resort in Maldives Planned by
Lithuanian Firm, HUFFINGTON PosT (Feb. 3, 2011, 1:25 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/03/blonde-island-resort-in-m_n
818005.html.
114. The 'Island of the Blonds' in Maldives to be Shaped like Mega High-
Heeled Shoe, supra note 106.
115. Dapkus, supra note 113.
116. Margarita Jankauskaite, Director of the Lithuanian Center for
Equality Advancement, told the Associated Press: "I am ashamed that this
initiative came from my country. This only sends a message to the world that
Lithuania is a country of cheap beer and cheap blond women." Id.
117. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
118. Id.
119. See Boyle, supra note 105.
120. Dapkus, supra note 113.
121. McGuinness, supra note 109.
122. Id.
123. See Dapkus, supra note 113.
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recognized defense to an employment decision. It is therefore legally
significant for companies to rely on their IP rights to defend
business decisions, rather than a mere image or a brand. 124 That is
because, among other reasons, intellectual property has been
recognized as a form of property, 125 along with the attendant
privileges of that label. 126 This sometimes means, for instance, that
greater weight is given to IP concerns when balanced against other
constitutional considerations such as the First Amendment.127
Moreover, IP rights of employers can also outweigh fundamental
rules and policies governing employee conduct. Thus, for instance,
the enforcement of noncompetition agreements permits divergence
from the employment-at-will doctrine by restricting employee
mobility and competitive choices. 128
As the examples in Part I demonstrate, branded service is
becoming a recommended way of doing business and differentiating
between services in a competitive market. In doing so, employers
have wide latitude to make decisions about the direction of their
business and their workplace, including who to hire and how they
should look at work. 129  As the previous examples illustrate,
employers generally have the right to regulate the appearance of
employees. 130 For instance, an employer can regulate grooming, 131
hair length,132 weight,133 sexual or physical attractiveness,13 4 and
124. A "brand name" as used in the business and marketing context does not
carry legal significance. It could include a trademark but not necessarily so.
See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 4:18 (4th ed. 2012). A marketing tool must meet certain criteria in order to
qualify for trademark protection. Id. § 3:3.
125. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535
U.S. 722, 730 (2002) ("[A patent] is a property right."); Krebs Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc. v. Valley Motors, Inc., 141 F.3d 490, 497-98 (3d Cir. 1998)
(stating that "[t]rademarks are property" and, "[u]nder Pennsylvania law, '[t]he
ownership of a trade-mark has, in general, been considered as a right of
property."'(internal citations omitted)).
126. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 108, 108 (1990).
127. See generally Elizabeth A. Rowe, Trade Secret Litigation and Free
Speech: Is It Time to Restrain the Plaintiffs?, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1425 (2009).
128. See generally PEGGIE R. SMITH ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYMENT LAW
145-48 (2009); Elizabeth A. Rowe, When Trade Secrets Become Shackles:
Fairness and the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 7 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
167, 188-91 (2005).
129. See, e.g., Lucille M. Ponte & Jennifer L. Gillan, Gender Performance
Over Job Performance: Body Art Work Rules and the Continuing Subordination
of the Feminine, 14 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 319, 322 (2007).
130. See, e.g., Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977).
131. See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah's'Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th
Cir. 2006).
132. See, e.g., Harper v. Blockbuster Entm't Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1386 (11th
Cir. 1998).
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the image of its employees. 135 Thus, Disney's and the Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders' extensive regulation of every detail of their
employees' appearance is permissible. Whether it is maintaining
the "Disney Look" or the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders' image
restrictions, employers routinely enact policies to govern their
employees. Only if such policies create an "unequal burden" on a
protected class might the employer then run afoul of Title VII.136
The next Subpart outlines the contours of Title VII that are relevant
to this Article.
A. Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination
in employment decisions on the basis of sex, race, religion, color, or
national origin. 137 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA") separately prohibits discrimination based on age, and for
the purposes of this Article, the protections are essentially the same
as under Title VII.138 A Title VII violation can be brought under one
of two theories: disparate treatment or disparate impact. With
disparate treatment a plaintiff must show that the employer has a
facially discriminatory employment practice and proof of
discriminatory motive. 139 Thus, there is intentional discrimination
against a protected group; for example, an employer does not hire
men for a particular job (such as Southwest Airlines not hiring men
as flight attendants).
In setting out a prima facie case for disparate treatment, a
plaintiff must establish, among other things, that he applied for and
was qualified for the job.140 Whether a person is qualified for a job is
133. See, e.g., Marks v. Nat'l Commc'ns Ass'n, 72 F. Supp. 2d 322, 330(S.D.N.Y. 1999).
134. See, e.g., Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 854 (9th Cir.
2000); Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 116 P.3d 1123, 1131 (Cal. 2005).
135. See, e.g., Wislocki-Goin v. Mears, 831 F.2d 1374, 1376 (7th Cir. 1987).
136. See Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1110 ("Under established equal burdens
analysis, when an employer's grooming and appearance policy does not
unreasonably burden one gender more than the other, that policy will not
violate Title VII."); see also EEOC Compl. Man. § 619.4(d) (BNA) (Aug. 2009)(permitting dress codes that are "equivalent for men and women with respect to
the standard or burden that they impose"); Alexis Conway, Leaving Employers
in the Dark: What Constitutes a Lawful Appearance Standard After Jespersen v.
Harrah's Operating Co.?, 18 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 107, 107-08 (2007).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006) ("It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer . .. to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual ... because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.")
138. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2), § 623(f) (2006).
139. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).
140. See id. at 802.
40 [Vol. 48
IP AND EMPLOYEE SELECTION
based on the demands of the job, as specified by the employer. 141
However, it is the plaintiffs burden to establish the qualifications of
the job and prove that he was qualified. 142 The burden then shifts to
the defendant-employer to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.143 It is then up to the
plaintiff to rebut the employer's reason and prove that it is
pretextual.144
Claims based on disparate impact, on the other hand, involve
employment practices that are facially neutral but have a
disproportionate effect on a protected group; this is unintentional
discrimination.145 Hiring only blonds, for instance, may exclude
non-Caucasians. To succeed on a disparate impact claim, a plaintiff
must show that an employer used "a particular employment practice
that causes a disparate impact" on the basis of a protected class, and
the employer must have failed to show that "the challenged practice
is job related for the position in question and consistent with
business necessity."146  Because this theory focuses on the
consequences of the employer's choices rather than the employer's
intent or motivation, plaintiffs in these disparate impact claims
must offer statistical evidence to support their assertion that an
employment practice created a disparate impact. 147
The theory on which a discrimination case proceeds also affects
the defense that may be raised by the employer and the attending
evidentiary framework under which the case must proceed. While a
thorough discussion and analysis of the complicated scheme of these
theories is beyond the scope of this Article,148 this Part will outline
the two pathways that are relevant to the arguments in this Article.
As is discussed below, the bona fide occupational qualification
("BFOQ") defense applies in disparate treatment cases, and a
business necessity defense applies in disparate impact cases. Most
employment discrimination claims tend to be based on disparate
treatment.149 Ultimately, for the purposes of this Article, there is no
significant difference in how IP would be used with either defense.
Accordingly, they are both briefly discussed below.
141. See Thornley v. Penton Pub., Inc., 104 F.3d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1997).
142. 1 LEx K. LARSON, LARSON ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 8.02[3] (2d
ed. 2012).
143. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
144. See Gorence v. Eagle Food Ctrs., Inc., 242 F.3d 759, 764 (7th Cir. 2001).
145. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-32 (1971).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (2006).
147. See 2 LARSON, supra note 142, § 21.03.
148. See generally 1 id. § 11.02 (discussing the BFOQ defense); 2 id. § 23.04-
.07 (discussing the business necessity defense).
149. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment
Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. &
PoL'Y REV. 103, 112 (2009).
2013] 41
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
B. Applying the BFOQ Defense
The BFOQ defense is an affirmative defense in disparate
treatment cases where the employer admits to discriminatory
practices. It is successful when an employer can establish that the
protected criterion (except as to race)1so is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
business.161 In essence, it provides a justification for employment
practices that are otherwise discriminatory, where the employer can
prove that its policy is necessary. The burden of proof falls on the
employer. 152
The BFOQ is meant to be a narrow exception to intentional
discrimination.15 3 It is most often used in gender discrimination
cases, and as such, much of its jurisprudential development to date
has been in the context of those cases. 154 Contributing to further
limitations in development of the law is the fact that there is very
little legislative history on the BFOQ defense, which has led to
varying and sometimes inconsistent interpretations by the courts. 55
Courts analyzing BFOQ defenses generally apply a three-part
test, the most significant of which is the "essence of the business"
test.156 The essence test was derived from a Fifth Circuit opinion
involving Pan American World Airways, where the airline used the
BFOQ defense to justify its hiring of females only as flight
attendants.15 7 The court ruled that "[d]iscrimination based on sex is
valid only when the essence of the business operation would be
undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively." 58 The
court found that the primary function of an airline (i.e., the essence
of its business operation) was to "transport passengers safely from
one point to another," and that "having male stewards [would not] so
150. By its own terms, the provision does not include race. However, where
racial characteristics are necessary for job performance a necessity defense has
been recognized. See Miller v. Tex. State Bd. of Barber Exam'rs, 615 F.2d 650,
654 (5th Cir. 1980) (involving an undercover investigator).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) ("[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to hire and employ employees ... on the basis of his
religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.").
152. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 248 (1989).
153. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1988) [hereinafter EEOC Regulations].
154. See MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 284-86 (1988).
155. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986);
Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 297 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
156. See 1 BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 404-05 (4th ed. 2007). The two other tests are the "all or
substantially all" test and absence of reasonable alternatives to accomplish the
business mission with less discriminatory impact. Id.
157. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1971).
158. Id. at 388.
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seriously affect the operation of an airline as to jeopardize" that
purpose.159
Around the same time, Playboy Enterprises was also challenged
for hiring only females as Bunnies. However, it was successful in
arguing that being female is a BFOQ for being a Playboy Bunny. 160
Supporting that conclusion was the court's determination that the
primary task of the Bunny was sex appeal, not just serving
cocktails. 161 The Bunny was therefore reasonably necessary to the
normal operations of Playboy Clubs.162
1. From Southwest Airlines to Hooters
Ten years after Diaz v. Pan American was decided, Southwest
Airlines's female-only policy was also challenged. In Wilson v.
Southwest Airlines,163 a Texas district court held that Southwest
could not exclude men from its ranks of flight attendants despite the
airline's claim that being female was "reasonably necessary" to its
love-themed enterprise. 164 In Wilson, a class of more than one
hundred male job applicants challenged Southwest's female-only
hiring policy for flight attendants as violating Title VII's prohibition
against gender discrimination.1 65 In its defense, Southwest claimed
that being female was a BFOQ for its flight attendants. 66
The Wilson court explained that Southwest had to satisfy a two-
part inquiry to qualify for a BFOQ defense: (1) does the particular
job require only one gender? and (2) is that requirement reasonably
necessary to the essence of the employer's business? 67 In claiming
that it met the test, Southwest conceded that men were capable of
performing the "mechanical functions" of a flight attendant.168 Yet
it argued that men could not fulfill the nonmechanical functions,
such as attracting males who preferred female flight attendants and
159. Id.
160. St. Cross v. Playboy Club, No. CSF-22618-70, Appeal No. 773, at 7 (N.Y.
State Human Rights App. B. 1971), available at http://njlegallib.rutgers.edu
/misc/aromi.pdf (including a letter from the New York Division of Human
Rights explaining that the original St. Cross opinion has been lost from the
archives and the relevant text from St. Cross. Note that the pagination in the
preceding citation corresponds to the page in the Aromi opinion which cites the
St. Cross decision).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
164. Id. at 303-04.
165. Id. at 293.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 299.
168. Id. at 300; see also Hailes v. United Air Lines, 464 F.2d 1006, 1008 n.2
(5th Cir. 1972) ("[Flemale sex is not a bona fide occupational qualification for
the position of airline cabin attendant.").
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preserving Southwest's unique feminized personality.169 Thus, the
airline contended that women were reasonably necessary to
maintaining the love theme that was the "essence" of a Southwest
flight.
Recognizing that it had to distinguish itself from Pan American,
Southwest argued that its business essence was not just
transporting passengers but transporting passengers with "love."170
It argued that its image as the "love airline" made it unique, was
important to its financial success, and justified its policy.171 The
court rejected the arguments, finding irrelevant Southwest
customers' preference for females as flight attendants and
Southwest's financial concerns. 172
In rejecting Southwest's arguments, the court reaffirmed that
customer preference alone cannot support a BFOQ defense. 173 The
court explained that when based on sex appeal, a BFOQ is
permitted only when the business's primary service is sex or
vicarious sexual recreation, such as a topless bar or social escort
service.174  In contrast, Southwest's primary service was safe
transportation from one location to another. The fact that its
legions of attractive flight attendants made the journey more
enjoyable was "the manner of job performance, not the job
performed."176
It is curious that the contours of the BFOQ defense were
derived from two major cases involving airlines. The outcome in
these cases may have been influenced by the backdrop against
which they developed. At the time, before airline deregulation, fares
were determined by the government, and the airlines were left to
differentiate themselves from their competitors by the kind of
service they offered and the image they portrayed.176  The
"stewardess" had to be "a nurse in the sky, a surrogate wife for
169. Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 300.
170. Id. at 294, 300.
171. Id. at 300, 303.
172. See id. at 303-04.
173. Id. at 303; see also Stephen F. Befort, BFOQ Revisited: Johnson
Controls Halts the Expansion of the Defense to Intentional Sex Discrimination,
52 OHIo ST. L.J. 5, 14 (1991) ("To allow a BFOQ because of a customer's
preference for a female flight attendant or a male salesman would only serve to
perpetuate the very prejudices that Title VII was meant to overcome.").
174. Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 301. Critics say it is ironic that a BFOQ
defense can protect sex-service jobs that objectify and denigrate women. See
Katie Manley, Note, The BFOQ Defense: Title VII's Concession to Gender
Discrimination, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 169, 185 (2009) (asserting that
the BFOQ can be used to subordinate women).
175. Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 302.
176. RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, THE RACE CARD: How BLUFFING ABOUT BIAS
MAKES RACE RELATIONS WORSE 149 (2008).
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lonely business passengers, a fantasy sexpot ('coffee, tea, or me'),
and a fashion model."177
Along came the women's movement, and courts began to
recognize these requirements as contrary to our antidiscrimination
policies. As between corporate "image" and profitability on the one
hand and the strong public policy of permitting equal opportunity
and civil rights for men and women on the other, the balance
justifiably tipped to the latter. Thus, Wilson v. Southwest Airlines
was likely influenced by the fact that it was framed as an employer
asserting objectionable control over women at a time when feminist
groups, and flight attendant activists in particular, were fighting
hard to draw attention to the status of women. 178 Indeed, groups
like Stewardesses for Women's Rights identified sexiness as a safety
issue for airlines, arguing that passengers may not take them
seriously in emergency situations. 79
Since the 1990s through today, there have been signs that the
political winds may not be blowing as strongly in favor of the pro-
feminist cause in these kinds of cases. A lawsuit involving Hooters,
for example, shows that today these high-profile cases are more
likely to be settled than litigated, and that businesses are at the
cusp of actually using the language of IP to defend their employee
selection practices.
In late 1993, several Chicago-area men filed a class-action
employment discrimination lawsuit, claiming that they had been
turned down for server jobs at Hooters because of their gender.180 In
March 1996, a federal judge in the Northern District of Illinois
certified the class of men. 181 By then, Hooters already had gone on
the offensive, orchestrating a public-relations campaign that
featured billboards with a muscular, mustachioed man in the
Hooters Girls' tiny shorts and tank top.182 The billboard loudly
screamed: "Hooters GUYS? Washington Get a Grip."183  In
November 1995, the company held the 100 Hooters Girls March on
Washington, where the buxom women left a pair of shorts and a
tank top on a sidewalk in the nation's capital.184 Hooters claimed
that patrons sent 500,000 complaining postcards-at the company's
177. Id.
178. See Avery & Crain, supra note 8, at 121.
179. Kathleen Barry, "Too Glamorous to be Considered Workers" Flight
Attendants and Pink-Collar Activism in Mid-Twentieth Century America, 3
LAB.: STUD. WORKING-CLASS HIST. AM. 119, 135-36 (2006).
180. About Hooters, supra note 80.
181. Latuga v. Hooters, No. 93C7709, 1996 WL 164427, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
29, 1996).
182. Editorial, Looks As If Washington Got A Grip, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL,
May 5, 1996, at G4.
183. Id.
184. Maxwell, supra note 92.
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expense-to their representatives in Congress. 185 The most vocal
critic within Congress was U.S. Representative Harris W. Fawell, an
Illinois Republican and chairman of the House subcommittee on
employer-employee relations. 186 Fawell publicly needled the EEOC,
questioning why it was focusing on Hooters when the commission
had a backlog of more than 100,000 cases.187 In Fawell's opinion,
the restaurant chain had a legitimate gender BFOQ defense for
female food servers. 188
The EEOC announced in 1996 that it was closing its
investigation, citing scarce resources but noting that "[d]enying any
American a job simply because of his or her sex is a serious issue."189
Hooters settled the class-action lawsuit one year later, agreeing to
pay $3.75 million and to hire more men for bartending and other
positions but steadfastly retaining the right to keep its female-only
Hooters Girls. 190 By then, the company had adopted a parlance
hinting at an understanding of the BFOQ exception. Company
spokesman Mike McNeil told USA Today that Hooters does not sell
food; it sells sex appeal. "To have female sex appeal, you have to be
female," McNeil said.191
Even if it intuitively makes sense that only a female can sell
female sex appeal, it is not clear that this argument alone would win
the day for Hooters, or for the next company needing to defend a
discrimination claim. The bottom line is that when faced with an
employment discrimination claim, an employer must show that its
employee selection decision is justified as a BFOQ or as a business
necessity. 192 Exactly what circumstances would establish either of
these defenses is not entirely clear, as the cases appear riddled with
inconsistencies. Nevertheless, a few patterns and principles emerge
that are relevant to this Article and that have paved the way for
introducing the language of IP into an employment discrimination
defense.
185. About Hooters, supra note 80.
186. Hutchcraft, supra note 93.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Associated Press, Federal Agency Won't Get into Hooters Case, Says
Issue Should Be Taken Seriously, AKRON BEACON J., May 2, 1996, at A6.
190. Del Jones, Hooters to Pay $3.75 Million in Sex Suit, USA TODAY, Oct. 1,
1997, at 1A.
191. Id.
192. See, e.g., Levin v. Delta Air Lines, 730 F.2d 994, 1001 (5th Cir. 1984).
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2. Acceptable and Unacceptable Motives for BFOQ
The employment-at-will doctrine 93 gives employers very wide
latitude to regulate their employees and the workplace. 194 The
exception to the bar against intentional discrimination (except as to
race)195 applies when employers in disparate treatment cases can
establish that their selection criterion is a BFOQ reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the business.196
As noted earlier, the BFOQ defense is a narrow exception. This
means that many defenses propounded by employers as their motive
for discriminatory choices will not suffice to escape liability. For
instance, gender stereotypes are generally not permitted. In Diaz v.
Pan American World Airways, Pan American's argument that
women were better at "providing reassurance to anxious passengers,
giving courteous personalized service and, in general, making flights
as pleasurable as possible" was rejected as a BFOQ defense.197 The
EEOC guidelines also provide that "[t]he refusal to hire an
individual based on stereotyped characterizations of the sexes" will
not suffice as a BFOQ exception. 98
Similarly, courts generally are not persuaded by BFOQ defenses
based exclusively on customer preference. This argument can often
be intertwined with stereotypes, as was illustrated in the early
airline cases. In Diaz, the court explained that "it would be totally
anomalous if we were to allow the preferences and prejudices of the
customers to determine whether the sex discrimination was
valid."199 Thus, Southwest Airlines's argument that passengers
prefer its sexy female flight attendants was also not successful. 200
Rather, sex appeal appears to be more readily accepted as a BFOQ
for businesses that primarily sell sex, such as a strip club (or the
193. The employment-at-will doctrine provides an employer great discretion
in hiring and firing employees for any reason. See generally SMITH ET AL., supra
note 128, at 21.
194. See Avery & Crain, supra note 8, at 90.
195. By its own terms, the provision does not include race. However, where
racial characteristics are necessary for job performance, a necessity defense has
been recognized. See Miller v. Tex. State Bd. of Barber Exam'rs, 615 F.2d 650,
652-53 (5th Cir. 1980) (involving an undercover investigator).
196. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2006) ("[I]t shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees . .. on the
basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where
religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise.").
197. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 387 (5th Cir. 1971).
198. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(ii) (2012).
199. Diaz, 442 F.2d at 389.
200. Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 302 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
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Playboy Bunnies).201 This can be a very unclear line to draw,
however, especially for businesses like Hooters that sell food and sex
appeal.202
A few categories of motives are more likely to be successful than
those relying on stereotypes and customer preferences. These
include authenticity and privacy.203  Again, however, the line
between what a court might accept as permissible or not continues
to be unclear. The courts' various inconsistencies in applying
antidiscrimination law have been widely noted by scholars.204 There
has also been confusion and misapplication between the BFOQ
defense and the business necessity concept. 2 05  This Article
highlights some of the areas where these inconsistencies appear.
a. Authenticity
EEOC guidelines recognize a BFOQ and thus protect hiring for
authenticity or genuineness. 206 In such cases employers argue that
preserving the authenticity of a product or service requires that a
person be of a particular sex, national origin, or religion. This
reasoning permits a Chinese restaurant to hire only chefs from
China 207 and a Catholic university to hire only Jesuit priests to
teach philosophy.208 Authenticity is a critical part of Disney's brand.
Company recruiters travel overseas to find college-aged workers to
serve as "cultural representatives" in the countries of EPCOT.209
About 3,500 members of Disney's workforce are international
201. See id. at 301; see also Ann C. McGinley, Babes and Bee/cakes:
Exclusive Hiring Arrangements and Sexy Dress Codes, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL'Y 257, 267 (2007).
202. See Hooters discussion supra Part I.C.
203. Safety concerns can also serve as a BFOQ for employers if they can
show that concerns for public safety justify eliminating certain persons because
of their age or gender. See, e.g., W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 419
(1985) (holding that age was a BFOQ for flight engineers since age-related
disabilities could prevent engineers from assisting the pilot); Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335-36 (1977) (holding that a maximum security
prison could exclude women guards because the ability to maintain a safe and
secure prison would be otherwise jeopardized).
204. See, e.g., Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 26 (2000); Kimberly A. Yuracko,
Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex
Discrimination, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 147, 150 (2004); Manley, supra note 174, at
177.
205. See LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 156, at 358-60.
206. EEOC Regulations, supra note 153.
207. See Util. Workers v. S. Cal. Edison, 320 F. Supp. 1262, 1265 (C.D. Cal.
1970).
208. See Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chi., 803 F.2d 351, 353-54 (7th Cir. 1986).
209. See Johnson, supra note 28. EPCOT pays homage to eleven countries:
Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Morocco, Japan, the United States, Italy,
Germany, China, Norway, and Mexico. Id. at 921.
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recruits who must be fluent in English and emulate friendliness and
poise while sharing information about their native countries with
EPCOT visitors.210
Moreover, the EEOC guidelines list actors and actresses as an
example of hiring that might fall under the authenticity
exception. 211 It is unclear how broadly one may define actor or
actress, however. One commentator has wondered, is a Playboy
Bunny at a Playboy Club in "a theatrical production that hires
women to act in the roles of women[?]" 2 12 Indeed, Bunnies were told
that "[t]he Playboy Club is more like show business than the saloon
business, and the Bunnies are stars. We have managers for
directors, bartenders for stage managers, and porters and busboys
for stagehands."213 Another interesting application of authenticity
involving practices in Hollywood is discussed later.
b. Privacy
Concerns for third parties' privacy interests have been
recognized as an acceptable BFOQ defense. Thus, in healthcare and
other similar settings where patients' or customers' bodily privacy is
involved, employers may choose their employees based on sex. 214
Accordingly, hospitals may hire female nurses in labor and delivery
rooms and in other personal care-giving capacities. 215 It begs the
question, however, whether these privacy interests of third parties
are not essentially the same as the forbidden customer preference
and stereotype motives. 216 Moreover, if the essence of the business
for Southwest Airlines is simply to fly passengers safely, shouldn't
the essence of the business of a hospital delivery room be to deliver
babies safely?2 17  Despite these inconsistencies, the privacy
exception is justified if it is somehow materially different from mere
210. Charles Hillinger, Epcot's International Pavilions Operate as True
Global Village, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1990, at E4; see also Gupta v. Walt Disney
World Co., 256 F. App'x 279, 280-81 (11th Cir. 2007) (describing the job of
"Cultural Representative" as interacting with guests and sharing the culture,
tradition, history, and language of the country that they are representing). In
Gupta, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Disney, which had
been accused of discriminating against the plaintiff for not being a native
Norwegian. Id. at 282-83.
211. EEOC Regulations, supra note 153.
212. McGinley, supra note 201, at 269.
213. MILLER, supra note 3, at 78-79.
214. See Manley, supra note 174, at 177.
215. See, e.g., Yuracko, supra note 204, at 156.
216. See, e.g., Michael J. Frank, Justifiable Discrimination in the News and
Entertainment Industries: Does Title VII Need a Race or Color BFOQ?, 35
U.S.F. L. REV. 473, 490-91 (2001); Manley, supra note 174, at 186-87.
217. See Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1196 (E.D. Ark.
1981) (permitting sex as a BFOQ for an obstetrical nurse where testimony
suggested that more than one half of patients would object to male nurses).
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customer preference. Perhaps it is grounded in the recognition of a
constitutional right to privacy and the harm to one's dignity that
results from a violation. Some commentators have argued, however,
that no such constitutional right to privacy exists sufficient to
override antidiscrimination law.218
c. Business Necessity
Unlike the BFOQ defense, the business necessity doctrine is not
statutorily based and applies to disparate impact claims. Like the
BFOQ case law, however, the standards for the business necessity
defense have been inconsistent.219  When an inference of
discrimination arises from the discriminatory impact of a neutral-
appearing employment policy, business necessity can be used by the
employer to dismiss that inference. 220 Unlike with a BFOQ defense,
while the employer bears the burden of production in raising
business necessity, the plaintiff ultimately carries the burden of
persuasion in proving a disparate impact claim.221
In general, it is easier for an employer to establish a business
necessity defense than a BFOQ defense. The focus is on whether
the employment practice is necessary to the employer's business.
Business necessity is satisfied if the employer's practice has a
"manifest relationship" to job performance. 222 The Supreme Court
has noted that the employment practice need not be "essential" or
"indispensable" to the employer's business. 223 Business necessity is
therefore not narrowly focused on job performance but allows for
broader consideration of issues that affect the employer's interest,
such as safety2 2 4 and cost. 2 25 Unlike BFOQ, it also applies to all
types of discrimination, including race. 2 2 6 Arguably, IP concerns
would also fit readily here.
218. See, e.g., Deborah A. Calloway, Equal Employment and Third Party
Privacy Interests: An Analytical Framework for Reconciling Competing Rights,
54 FORDHAM L. REV. 327, 342 (1985); Amy Kapczynski, Note, Same-Sex Privacy
and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 112 YALE L. J. 1257, 1267-68 (2003).
219. See THOMAS R. HAGGARD, UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
94 (2001).
220. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
221. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989),
superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006), as recognized in Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011).
222. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
223. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
224. See Hayes v. Shelby Mem'l Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1552 (11th Cir. 1984).
225. See, e.g., Mark S. Brodin, Costs, Profits, and Equal Opportunity, 62
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 318, 334 (1987).
226. See generally 2 LARSON, supra note 142, at § 23.04-.07 (discussing the
business necessity defense generally, and how an employment criterion or
method that in practice creates a disparate impact on the basis of race can be
defended with a business necessity argument).
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d. Apparently Exempt Sectors
In addition to the above defenses, there are also other areas
that seem to enjoy de facto exemptions for employment
discrimination. In part, these may implicitly rely on some of the
acceptable motives and exceptions discussed above or other policy
reasons. Regardless, they illustrate the fact that the
antidiscrimination policies can be and are indeed outweighed by
business, industry, and other policy concerns that may or may not
be weightier than IP rights.
i. Hollywood
While employers may not post ads for employees that specify a
particular race or gender, 227 the law does not seem to apply to the
entertainment industry. More specifically, when casting actors and
actresses for roles in films, the typical practice in Hollywood is to
use a "breakdown" that could read "Male. Caucasian late 40's."228
This practice has contributed to a system where women and people
of color receive fewer roles and less compensation for those roles. 22 9
"Actors of color live in a world where almost all roles are denied
them because of their race . . . . [They] are silently and
automatically excluded from consideration for the majority of offered
roles simply because they would be 'inappropriate.' 2 30 Beyond race,
even writers in the industry who are over the age of forty complain
that television networks refuse to hire them because advertisers
want writers who can communicate "youthful material."231
Yet, to date, this Hollywood practice appears to go
unchallenged, as there have been no published Title VII
discrimination cases filed by actors.232 Even if a claim were filed, it
is likely that a defendant would use the BFOQ, authenticity, and
the First Amendment as defenses to justify its casting decisions. 233
227. Title VII prohibits an employer from "print[ing] or caus[ing] to be
printed or published any notice or advertisement relating to
employment .. . indicating any preference, limitation, specification, or
discrimination based, based on race, color. . . [or] sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b)
(2006).
228. Russell K. Robinson, Casting and Caste-ing: Reconciling Artistic
Freedom and Antidiscrimination Norms, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 10 (2007).
229. Id. at 18, 23; Jennifer L. Sheppard, Theatrical Casting - Discrimination
or Artistic Freedom?, 15 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 267, 268 (1991).
230. Sheppard, supra note 229, at 271 (internal citations omitted).
231. Gina Browne, Comment, Target Hiring to Reach a Target Audience, 23
Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 125, 127-132 (2002).
232. A recent search as of August 6, 2012, revealed no published cases
involving claims relevant to this Article. See also Robinson, supra note 228, at
1-2 (discussing a hypothetical claim of race discrimination in casting due to a
lack of actual published cases and noting why cases have not been filed).
233. See id. at 40-45.
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Indeed, even the EEOC guidelines recognize (without explanation or
elaboration) that sex can be a BFOQ defense for a claim by an actor
or actress "for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness."234 Yet,
when one views movie studios as businesses whose primary concern
in casting is to ensure high gross receipts for films, 235 it is difficult to
see why they are not or should not be in relatively the same position
as any other business that wants to select its employees in a way
that would maximize its revenues. Instead, however, they are given
a certain "artistic freedom of choice" 236 that other businesses do not
enjoy (for better or worse).
ii. Churches
Akin to an extension of the authenticity defense, a Catholic
church cannot be sued for hiring only men to be priests. This is
because religious organizations have an express statutory exemption
in § 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that protects religious
organizations from religious discrimination suits. 237 Courts have
created an even broader exemption, however, that essentially bars
employees from suing religious organizations for employment
discrimination-the ministerial exception. 238
The ministerial exception has been interpreted broadly to cover
not only ordained ministers but also church secretaries, Catholic
school principals, church music teachers, and choir directors.239
Furthermore, it extends beyond churches to such workplaces as
"religious schools, universities, hospitals, and retirement homes."2 4 0
This judicially created exception, as well as the statutory exemption,
is grounded in the First Amendment religion clauses. 241  The
Supreme Court has recently recognized that this constitutional
grounding for the ministerial exception outweighs the societal
234. EEOC Regulations, supra note 153.
235. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 228, at 8.
236. Sheppard, supra note 229, at 269-70.
237. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2006).
238. See, e.g., Mark E. Chopko & Marissa Parker, Still a Threshold
Question: Refining the Ministerial Exception Post-Hosanna-Tabor, 10 FIRST
AMENDMENT L. REV. 233, 235 (2012) (supporting the ministerial exception);
Leslie C. Griffin, Smith and Women's Equality, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1831, 1844
(2011) (arguing that the ministerial exemption is harmful to women).
239. Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the
Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965,
1976 (2007).
240. Id. at 1977.
241. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp't
Opportunity Comm'n, 132 S. Ct. 694, 703 (2012) ("The Establishment Clause
prevents the Government from appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise
Clause prevents it from interfering with the freedom of religious groups to
select their own.").
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interest in enforcing employment discrimination laws. 24 2 Thus,
businesses with religious affiliation benefit from a kind of immunity
from employment discrimination that is far broader than the IP
Defense introduced in this Article.
III. INTRODUCING THE IP DEFENSE
If IP rights are powerful enough to allow a company control over
competitors and consumers, 243 it makes sense that those rights
should permit control over a company's own employees and image.
Already, IP regulates employee behavior and conduct (such as
protecting trade secrets and enforcing noncompetition agreements).
Thus, in some ways the IP Defense is essentially the same idea in
that it serves as a legitimate business reason for selecting
employees. It is not intended to provide carte blanche to
discriminate as it is, of course, limited by Title VII. Yet Title VII, as
the Supreme Court has recognized, is about balancing employee
rights with employer prerogatives. 244 The fact that the BFOQ and
business necessity defenses exist reflects the congressional intent
that employers retain flexibility in making hiring decisions that
affect the core of their business. 24 5 Therefore, just as IP rights can
sometimes trump employment-at-will principles as well as
constitutional protections (such as the First Amendment), 246 they
should also be entitled to consideration in the employment
discrimination framework.
At its simplest, the IP Defense permits an employer to use IP
rights as a legitimate business reason supporting its employee-
selection decision. The IP Defense does not alter the fundamental
tenets of employment discrimination law, nor does it swing the odds
242. Id. at 710.
243. See, e.g., James B. Kobak, Jr., Intellectual Property, Competition Law
and Hidden Choices Between Original and Sequential Innovation, 3 VA. J.L. &
TECH. 6, 18 (1998) (highlighting that intellectual property rights can be used
to control access by competitors); Elizabeth A. Rowe, Introducing a Takedown
for Trade Secrets on the Internet, 5 WIs. L REV. 1041, 1059 (2007) (commenting
that copyright holders can exercise a form of censorship by issuing takedown
notices); Elizabeth A. Rowe, Patents, Genetically Modified Foods, and IP
Overreaching, 64 SMU L. REV. 859, 871-76 (2011) (explaining that patent
license agreements prohibit farmers from saving or reselling seeds that they
have purchased).
244. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989).
245. Id. ("[T]he existence of the BFOQ exception shows Congress's
unwillingness to require employers to change the very nature of their
operations in response to the statute.").
246. See, e.g., S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S.
522, 541 (1987) ("The mere fact that the SFAA claims an expressive, as opposed
to a purely commercial, purpose does not give it a First Amendment
right ... [t]he [trademark owner's] right to prohibit use of the word. . . is at the
core of its legitimate property right.").
2013] 53
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
of winning away from plaintiffs in any significant way. Plaintiffs in
employment discrimination cases already face a much lower chance
of success relative to defendant-employers, and more generally to
other kinds of plaintiffs. 247  Indeed, favoring the application of
antidiscrimination policies, the IP Defense could benefit plaintiffs to
the extent that it adds value to considerations of pretext and greater
transparency in the litigation process. As one court has noted,
"subjective criteria 'are particularly easy for an employer to invent"'
when trying to defeat a plaintiffs discrimination claim, 2 48 and, as
such, the IP Defense would offer more objectivity and greater
assurance that the employer's proffered reason for its hiring decision
is legitimate and not a pretext.
Moreover, the IP Defense does not function as a grant of
immunity. Rather it requires balancing, on a case-by-case basis, the
IP rights at stake versus the societal interest in protecting
antidiscrimination policies, through the existing framework of Title
VII. As described below, it embodies several limiting principles that
place the burden on the defendant-employer to establish, among
other things, that there is a legitimate and strong nexus between
the propounded IP right and the employee-selection decision.
A. How the IP Defense Fits in Employment Discrimination
As envisioned here, the IP Defense is flexible in fitting within
the existing employment discrimination framework. It is not meant
to be a stand-alone affirmative defense (although it potentially could
be conceived that way) but can be integrated into rebutting a prima
facie case, asserting a business necessity defense, or asserting a
BFOQ defense. Thus, under whichever theory a Title VII claim
proceeds, the IP Defense could play a role.2 49  In the case of
unintentional discrimination, the IP Defense would be used to
bolster the employer's business necessity argument, rebutting the
inference that its decision was discriminatory. Moreover, the
defense could also be used by the employer to support its position
that its articulated motivations were not pretextual.
If, however, the claim proceeds under a disparate treatment
theory, the employer could use the IP Defense in two ways. First, it
could be used to challenge the plaintiffs prima facie case that she
was qualified for the job in the first place. If an employer produces a
247. See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 10.
248. Thomas v. Denny's, Inc., 111 F.3d 1506, 1510 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal
citations omitted).
249. It is probably more likely that applicable cases would proceed under a
disparate impact theory because many employers would not admit to
discriminating in their employee selection (and would have written job
descriptions and searches in such a way that they do not explicitly exclude a
protected class).
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job description that is tied to its IP, and the plaintiff does not meet
that description, then she is unlikely to establish that she was
indeed qualified for the position-a necessary element of the prima
facie case. 250 Courts respect an employer's judgment in setting out
the objective qualifications for a position as a business decision, one
which is granted great deference. 251 As one court noted, "The Court
does not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an
entity's business decisions." 252 As such, it is not up to a jury or judge
to determine whether such qualifications were reasonable. 253 Thus,
the IP Defense would serve to show that the plaintiff was not
qualified, while also serving as the articulated legitimate reason for
the employer's decision.254
Second, the IP Defense could also be used as part of the BFOQ
defense. While the employment law jurisprudence does not provide
a specific meaning for the "essence of the business," 2 5 5 it appears to
make a difference how broadly a court characterizes a company's
business purpose. For instance, if a court agrees that the purpose of
a Playboy Club is to sell sexual titillation, then the Playboy Club
may discriminate on the basis of sex by hiring attractive women. 256
If, however, the court characterizes it more broadly as a place that
serves food and drink (like Hooters),25 7 then the Club may not make
those very same choices. 258
The IP Defense could also serve as a limiting principle for the
BFOQ "essence." Some courts have noted that it would be self-
serving to allow companies to identify their essence. 259 Those courts
250. See, e.g., Schaffner v. Glencoe Park Dist., 256 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir.
2001).
251. Id. at 620-21; see also Kephart v. Inst. of Gas Tech., 630 F.2d 1217,
1223 (7th Cir. 1980); Jackson v. Univ. of New Haven, 228 F. Supp. 2d 156, 161
(D. Conn. 2002).
252. Dale v. Chi. Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458, 464 (7th Cir. 1986).
253. See Thornley v. Penton Publ'g, Inc., 104 F.3d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1997). If
the employer's criteria are subjective, rather than objectively stated, then such
reasons are considered when it presents evidence that its legitimate reasons
were not pretextual, rather than in the prima facie case. See Thomas, 111 F.3d
at 1510.
254. See Dale, 797 F.2d at 463-64.
255. See, e.g., Yuracko, supra note 204, at 160.
256. See Avery & Crain, supra note 8, at 44.
257. See generally Hi Ltd. P'ship v. Winghouse of Fla., Inc., 347 F. Supp. 2d
1256 (M.D. Fla. 2004), aff'd, 451 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2006). Hooters cannot
prevent a competitor from using a black tank top and black running shorts any
more than a steak restaurant can claim servers who wear tuxedos. Id. at 1258-
59.
258. See Patricia A. Casey, Does Refusing to Hire Men as Food Servers
Violate the Civil Rights Act? No: A Business Has a Right to Choose Its Own
Character, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1996, at 41.
259. See Yuracko, supra note 204, at 154-60 (discussing the ad hoc nature of
defining a business's essence in a BFOQ defense).
552013]
WAKE FOREST LAWREVIEW
may find it more persuasive for a company to identify its intellectual
property and establish objective evidence of such rights. Moreover,
courts have been inconsistent in the kinds of evidence they require
for a BFOQ defense. 260 The IP Defense could therefore enable
greater precision in that only companies that have satisfactory proof
of IP rights will have a chance of a favorable outcome on liability
using this defense.
Even those who favor expanding antidiscrimination laws to
protect other areas, such as appearance, recognize that it could be
difficult to set particular standards for courts and employers tojudge appearance. 261 The IP Defense may indeed be a step toward
better framing such protection because, to the extent appearance is
linked to a company's IP, it will be tied to a legitimate business
reason. Thus, in cases where retailers, like Abercrombie & Fitch,
have requirements on what clothes employees are permitted to wear
to work, and such requirements are alleged to have a disparate
impact on a certain class of people, the existence (or lack thereof) of
IP to support that requirement could make the decision easier for a
court and easier for a plaintiff.262
B. Evidentiary Principles and Considerations
Several principles guiding the application of the IP Defense
should also help to address concerns about its use in the litigation
process. These are derived from substantive considerations in the
employment discrimination laws to help ensure consistency with the
spirit and letter of Title VII case law discussed earlier. On
evidentiary matters related to the IP Defense, the employer would
bear the burden of proof. Depending on how the IP Defense is used
in the case, the burden could be one of production (as through the
prima facie case) or one of persuasion (e.g., the BFOQ defense). This
would affect the timing of when the evidence is introduced and also
the weight to be attached. Some of the key considerations are
discussed below.
1. Proof of IP
First, proof of the IP right would be required. This could be
demonstrated through a government-issued certificate if the IP is
registered or through proof of a valid common law claim. This would
go toward establishing, among other things, that the reason for the
260. See Manley, supra note 174, at 188-89.
261. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 61 STAN. L.
REV. 1033, 1068-69 (2009); Karen Zakrzewski, Comment, The Prevalence of
"Look"ism in Hiring Decisions: How Federal Law Should Be Amended to
Prevent Appearance Discrimination in the Workplace, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
431, 460-61 (2005).
262. See Zakrzewski, supra note 261, at 458-59.
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decision was not pretextual and that the IP is legitimate. It would
offer objective preexisting proof of the IP which guided the
employment decision. This first step is a determinative factor for
the IP Defense. The employer's ownership of valid IP rights is a
prerequisite for application of the IP Defense.
If a court is satisfied that the employer has valid IP rights, then
this prong is met and the other factors should be considered. 263 An
employer's status as holder of IP rights does not by itself provide
immunity against an employment discrimination claim (unlike the
ministerial exception, for instance).264 The court still needs to weigh
and balance the other considerations to determine whether they
meet the existing rigors of the Title VII framework. If the ultimate
finding is positive for the employer, then it is not liable.
If the court finds that the defendant has not established valid
IP rights, then the IP Defense is not applicable. However, the
employer may continue to pursue an applicable defense under the
currently existing employment discrimination framework. This
could mean that even if the proffered IP is not protected, for
example, the existing employment law will generally allow
employers to regulate their employees' grooming and appearance. 265
This could result in a win for the defendant under such defenses and
exceptions as appearance, authenticity, or business necessity. Thus,
in those circumstances, the IP Defense would have had no effect on
the outcome. Were the defense required, then failing the first prong
would have been fatal to the defendant. However, it is not
envisioned that it will be applied in a compulsory manner.
Where official registration of the IP has not been issued (such as
an unregistered trademark), one possible challenge for a court would
be determining whether the defendant has a valid right. In the area
of trade dress, for instance, there are many areas that remain
unclear or where the question of protection is a close call. When it
comes to marketing, for example, the cases suggest that general
marketing themes may not be protected.
"The aura about a product, the cachet that ownership or
display of it creates, and the kind of appeal it has to certain
consumers do not dress a good in trade. Rather, those
263. Another possible challenge is determining how, as a matter of
procedure, a court would make this determination as part of the employment
discrimination case. Perhaps a separate hearing would be required on the IP
claim, especially where there is no registered certificate.
264. See Corbin, supra note 239, at 1968.
265. See supra notes 129-136 and accompanying text.
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intangible 'things' emanate from the good, its dress, and the
marketing campaign that promotes the dressed good." 266
It would therefore be important that an employer be clear about
that which it seeks to protect, particularly when it involves a
combination, and identify it with specificity rather than in broad or
general terms. 267 The court would ultimately decide whether a
common law or other protectable IP right exists.
2. Relationship Between IP and Business Practice
The defendant should also demonstrate the relationship
between its IP and the business practice that resulted in the hiring
selection decision. In effect, this would be one way to satisfy the
court that the IP is integral to the operation of the business, rather
than devised for the purposes of the litigation. Simply because an
employer has IP protection in some area of its business does not
mean that it is related to the employee selection decision. While it
is not necessary that the look of the employee be protected, if, for
instance, the uniform (like the Playboy Bunny costume) is
trademarked, this would establish the necessary nexus for selecting
the right employee to wear the uniform. It would serve as one way
to prove the relationship between the IP and the essence of the
business or the business purpose. The employer may also offer
evidence of a business plan or other corroboration that the IP-
related business practice has been central to the business mission of
the enterprise.
3. Relationship Between IP and Job Description
The defendant should also confirm that the job description or
qualification is tied to the proffered IP. This is a further refinement
of the second consideration above. It goes to establish that the IP is
directly related to an employee's qualification for the job. This is
especially helpful in challenging a plaintiffs prima facie case that
she was qualified for a job in the first place. If an employer puts
forth evidence of a job description that is tied to its IP and the
plaintiff does not meet that description, the plaintiff is unlikely to
establish that she was indeed qualified for the position, a necessary
element of the prima facie case.2 68 Courts respect, as a business
decision, an employer's judgment in setting out the objective
266. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d
619, 630-31 (6th Cir. 2002).
267. See Best Cellars, Inc. v. Wine Made Simple, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 60, 71(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
268. See, e.g., Schaffner v. Glencoe Park Dist., 256 F.3d 616, 620-21 (7th
Cir. 2001).
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qualifications for a position, one which is granted great deference. 269
As such, it is not up to a jury or judge to determine whether the
articulated qualification was reasonable. 270 Accordingly, the IP
Defense would serve to show that the plaintiff was not qualified,
while also serving as the articulated legitimate reason for the
employer's decision. 271
4. Relationship Between IP and Business Success
Finally, the employer should demonstrate a direct economic or
financial correlation between the IP and its business success. This
will help to demonstrate in quantitative terms the significance of
the IP to the enterprise. One of the reasons why IP has come to play
such an important role in today's businesses is because of the
financial benefits associated with IP rights. Both directly and
indirectly, the economic value that IP contributes to companies is
tied to the bottom line. Thus, the fight to acquire and protect IP is
about revenues, profitability, and, in some instances, survival.
Because of the important antidiscrimination policies at stake,
however, it is desirable that the mere presence of IP does not
necessarily make the defense successful. Rather, the IP ought to be
at the core of the company's economic success. While the more likely
measure of the economic effect may be in financial terms (such as
revenues or profits), this should not be an exclusive method.
Depending on the circumstances (such as with more newly formed
companies), other economic measures, such as brand recognition or
market share, may also be useful indicators.
Departing from current employment discrimination
jurisprudence, consideration of the economic effect on the company
is an important consideration in the IP Defense. The employment
cases have not typically given much weight to the financial
consequences associated with employee selection. Thus, in
assessing whether a certain practice is necessary or essential to a
business, its financial effect on the company's profitability or
financial success has been disregarded. 272 Recall that the Wilson
court did not give any weight to the consideration of the effect on
269. Id. at 620-21; see also Kephart v. Inst. of Gas Tech., 630 F.2d 1217,
1223 (7th Cir. 1980); Jackson v. Univ. of New Haven, 228 F. Supp. 2d 156, 161
(D. Conn. 2002).
270. See Thornley v. Penton Pub., Inc., 104 F.3d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1997). If the
employer's criteria are subjective, rather than objectively stated, then such
reasons are considered when it presents evidence that its legitimate reasons
were not pretextual, rather than in the prima facie case. See Thomas v.
Denny's, Inc., 111 F.3d 1506, 1510 (10th Cir. 1997).
271. See Dale v. Chi. Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458, 464 (7th Cir. 1986).
272. See, e.g., Wilson v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 304 (N.D. Tex.
1981).
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Southwest's profitability. 27 3 This approach is inconsistent with the
economic realities of today's business environment and with the way
in which the law often regards economic interest.
Courts have generally recognized and protected the economic
interest of a corporation where certain conduct affects its ability to
do business, resulting in financial harm.2 7 4 This is true, for
instance, in the area of libel.275 Even the business necessity defense
allows for consideration of cost.276 Corporations not only should, but
must, prioritize the profitability and financial stability of their
businesses. It is a bedrock principle in corporate law that
corporations have a duty to their shareholders, and that duty
includes making money. 277 Whether articulated in such terms as
"fiduciary duty," "shareholder value maximization," or "shareholder
primacy," it is difficult to refute the importance of these goals and
obligations for businesses. 278  Accordingly, it does not seem
reasonable, especially in today's economic conditions and climate of
business competitiveness for courts to discount or disregard these
financial concerns in the employment discrimination context. While
the fear of lost profits should not justify or excuse illegal action,
these financial realities deserve consideration within the overall
picture of understanding a company's essence.
C. IP Compares Favorably to Existing Exceptions
As a normative matter, IP compares favorably to the wide
variety of defenses and exceptions that already exist to insulate
employee selection decisions. For instance, under the ministerial
exception, the First Amendment religion clauses push aside the
antidiscrimination laws. Sometimes IP outweighs First Amendment
concerns. 279 Accordingly, IP should at least enter into the balance
273. Id.
274. See, e.g., S. Air Transp., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 670 F. Supp. 38, 41
(D.D.C. 1987); Heritage Optical Ctr., Inc. v. Levine, 359 N.W.2d 210, 212 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1984); John L. Hines, Jr. et al., Anonymity, Immunity & Online
Defamation: Managing Corporate Exposures to Reputation Injury, 4 SEDONA
CONF. J. 97, 98-99 (2003).
275. See S. Air Transp., Inc., 670 F. Supp. at 41; Levine, 359 N.W.2d at 212;
Hines, Jr. et al., supra note 274.
276. See Brodin, supra note 225.
277. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684-85 (Mich. 1919).
278. See, e.g., Newby v. Enron Corp., 188 F. Supp. 2d 684, 704 (S.D. Tex.
2002) ("Directors and officers owe a fiduciary obligation to shareholders because
property has been entrusted to the corporate fiduciaries to be managed for the
shareholders' benefit."); Anant K. Sundaram & Andrew C. Inkpen, The
Corporate Objective Revisited, 15 ORG. Scl. 350, 350 (2004) ("[T]he logic of
shareholder value maximization is accepted as being so obvious that textbooksjust assert it, rather than argue for it.").
279. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 555-60 (1985) (noting that the First Amendment does not protect speech
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with discrimination laws. If religious workplaces have the authority
to decide who best will fulfill their mission, why shouldn't other
secular businesses that are IP owners have a similar right? This is
not to suggest that employment discrimination laws should be
replaced, reduced, or left to more efficient market forces.280 Rather,
it seems fair and reasonable to grant IP rights sufficient status as a
legitimate business reason upon which to base certain employee-
related decisions.
Furthermore, with the privacy exception (which some argue has
dubious constitutional grounding), the courts tend to bend their
interpretation of the essence of the business test, suggesting that
perhaps discrimination is measured on a malleable scale.281 Where
the right (like privacy) or authenticity (Hollywood) is strong enough,
then the essence test is interpreted in a manner that defines the
practice outside of the employment discrimination prohibitions.
Accordingly, IP rights should be weighted at least as heavily as
privacy on a scale that balances antidiscrimination policies.
Moreover, IP rights, in particular trademark rights, require
authenticity and consistency. Otherwise, trademark owners could
face losing their rights. Thus, to the extent the authenticity
argument supports the employment practices in Hollywood, it
should also support or be placed in an equivalent position with the
IP Defense.
It is widely accepted that employers are generally permitted to
regulate the appearance of their employees. In fact, some employers
would probably already argue that appearance is a necessary
qualification for the job. As one author has noted, "The Clift's
gorgeous new staff and designer uniforms were as important to its
image as its remodeled guest rooms and designer lobby. The Ritz-
Carlton's customers expect elegance and refinement, not the
working-class flash of big hair and press-on nails. . . ."282 It has also
been recognized that employers have a legitimate interest in
protecting the relationships between their employees and
customers. 283 "The employee in essence becomes the 'face' of the
employer."2 84 Accordingly, IP should be (and already is) a legitimate
justification for regulating employees, hiring employees, and
that infringes copyright); DVD Copy Control Ass'n, Inc. v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 14
(Cal. 2003) (weighing a property interest in trade secrets more heavily than
First Amendment concerns).
280. See RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAws 159 (1992).
281. See privacy discussion supra Part II.B.2.b.
282. FORD, supra note 176, at 143.
283. See Vantage Tech., LLC v. Cross, 17 S.W.3d 637, 645 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1999) (citing Hasty v. Rent-A-Driver, Inc., 671 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tenn. 1984)).
284. Id.
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deciding which prospective applicants are qualified to become
employees.
Another illustration of how IP already influences business
decisions is franchising. Franchisors, such as McDonald's, allow
franchisees to make use of their "intellectual property and brand
identity, marketing experience, and operational methods" 285 in
exchange for a licensing fee. Hooters of America, for instance,
currently operates or franchises 430 locations in twenty-seven
countries. 286 However, franchisors (and all those who otherwise
license their trademarks) are required to control the use of their
marks and to ensure the consistency of their use, in order to avoid
loss of the trademark right.287 Thus, businesses have an obligation
to ensure that their brand image-to the extent it is protected by
trademark rights-is accurate and consistent, even if it implicates
regulation of their employees. Indeed, an interesting case involving
a well-known franchise, Jazzercize, is worth noting. A few years
ago, a 240-pound aerobics instructor was denied the opportunity to
be a Jazzercise franchisee because she did not have the "fit
appearance" that was consistent with the brand's image.288 The
franchisor argued that an overweight aerobics instructor did not fit
the appropriate image for a company that sold fitness. 289
There may be some concern that the IP Defense might
encourage employers to make discriminatory decisions. While this
would certainly not be a desirable policy outcome, all things
considered, it is unlikely to be the case. If there were evidence that
the already existing defenses and exceptions to employment
discrimination have encouraged employers' discriminatory practices,
then perhaps that may be a pressing concern. In the absence of
such evidence, however, there is nothing about the nature of IP
rights that would make them more likely to be tied to or support
discriminatory choices. To the contrary, the kinds of IP rights that
may implicate employee selection are more likely to be driven by
decisions about company values, vision, and financial goals and
strategies. IP has become a critical and significant part of American
285. 62B AM. JUR. 2D Private Franchise Contracts § 4 (2005).
286. About Hooters, supra note 80. Hooters of America, and its trademark
rights, was purchased in 2011 by a consortium led by Chanticleer Holdings.
Sarah E. Lockyer, Hooters Sold to Chanticleer Holdings, NATION'S RESTAURANT
NEWS (Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.nrn.com/article/hooters-sold-chanticleer
-holdings.
287. See Sally M. Abel, Trademark Licensing, in 1 PRACTICING LAW INST.,
ADVANCED LICENSING AGREEMENTS 2009 at 89, 97 (Joseph Yang & Ira J. Levy
eds., 2009).
288. See Dan Ackman, The Case of the Fat Aerobics Instructor, FORBES.COM
(May 9, 2002), http://www.forbes.com/2002/05/09/0509portnick.html.
289. A lawsuit ensued, and the case settled. See Rhode, supra note 261, at
1063.
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businesses, innovation, and the economy. IP, including trademarks,
comprises the majority of most companies' intangible assets. 290
These IP rights serve as "market differentiators" for companies,
enhancing their economic value and appeal to consumers.291 To the
extent their objectives clash with societal norms and expectations,
then the marketplace will serve as a further safeguard to the legal
protections under Title VII.
The Playboy Clubs are a good example. There is now one
remaining Club in Las Vegas, which opened in 2006.292 Christie
Hefner once explained, "The clubs made a lot of money for years.
They were great image builders for us. When you think about it,
they were the original theme restaurants."293 She said the Clubs
simply became outdated. Men want to go to bars where they might
meet women. The Clubs started to lose their lure. "In a world
where there were single bars in every city, women weren't going to
go to hang out in a Playboy Club," she said.2 9 4 As businesses often
learn, the one-gender-workforce is not a recipe for ultimate success,
and image is not a static concept. While Hooters Restaurants might
have fared well, the sexy-female strategy did not work for Hooters
Airlines.295 Meanwhile, Southwest Airlines's new low-cost-joke-
cracking image and focus on customer service have kept it
soaring. 296 Even if it survives legal scrutiny, the Blond Island
Resort may wish to take note.
CONCLUSION
The realities of today's competitive business climate make it
necessary that companies distinguish themselves from competitors
in order to attract customers and maximize revenues. In utilizing a
290. KEVIN A. HAsSETT & ROBERT J. SHAPIRO, WHAT IDEAS ARE WORTH: THE
VALUE OF INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL AND INTANGIBLE ASSETS IN THE AMERICAN
ECONOMY, at V (2001), available at http://www.sonecon.com/docs/studies/Value
_of Intellectual CapitalinAmericanEconomy.pdf.
291. Joseph Richard Falcon, Comment, Managing Intellectual Property
Rights: The Cost of Innovation, 6 DUQ. Bus. L.J. 241, 250 (2004).
292. Pauline O'Connor, Playboy Club: The Sequel, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15,
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/15/fashion/15BOITE.html?scp=2&sq=
&st=nyt.
293. Paul Farhi, Christie Hefner Is Reshaping and Reviving Her Father's
Adult Empire, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 1997, at H1.
294. Id.
295. Hooters Air launched in 2003. It included two Hooters girls on every
flight (in addition to a regular flight crew). Hooters Air started off as a small,
regional carrier based out of Myrtle Beach, S.C. At its height, the airline flew
to fifteen destinations, including Las Vegas and the Bahamas. Operating at a
heavy loss, the airline closed in 2006. See Steven Lott, Hooters Air to Drop
Scheduled Service, AVIATION DAILY, Apr. 3, 2006, at 6.
296. See Amy Cortese, Inventive Minds, CHIEF EXECUTIVE.NET (Sept. 30,
2001), http://chiefexecutive.net/inventive-minds.
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branded service approach, a company's IP may influence the
selection of employees. When such decisions result in employment
discrimination claims, this Article introduced a novel approach to
bridge the gap between employment discrimination law and IP law.
The proposed IP Defense has the flexibility to fit within the existing
Title VII employment discrimination framework. While there
remains much to refine about precisely how it may be implemented
and accompanying implications, it is the right time to open the
discussion.
